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Comments
The Medical Costs of AIDS: Abandoning the HIV-
Infected Employee
WHEN THEY SAW [JOB] FROM A DISTANCE, THEY COULD HARDLY RECOGNIZE
HIM; THEY BEGAN TO WEEP ALOUD.. . . THEN THEY SAT ON THE GROUND WITH
HIM FOR SEVEN DAYS AND SEVEN NIGHTS. No ONE SAID A WORD TO HIM, BECAUSE
THEY SAW HOW GREAT HIS SUFFERING WAS. 1
Our society has placed the onus of health care funding on the
employment relationship. Employers currently play a major role in
the adequacy of an American's health care. Enter the human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV),2 which has evoked a new era of
heightened prejudices and fears.' The office of this paper is to
identify the means by which an employer can legitimately discrim-
inate and significantly limit the amount of health care benefits af-
forded to HIV-infected employees, and to highlight the difficulties
in the alternatives to such lawful discrimination.
THE VIRUS
The retrovirus HIV attacks the immune system by infecting the
white blood cells called T-lymphocytes.4 An individual is deter-
1. Job 2:12-13, the Holy Bible, New International Version. Copyright 1973, 1978,
1984. Used by permission of Zondervan Bible Publishers.
2. In addition to the term "HIV," the scientific community also refers to the virus as
"HTLV-III" (Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III) and "LAV" (Lymphadenopathy As-
sociated Virus). See M. E. Lally-Green, Is Aids a Handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 After School Board v Arline and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987., 19 U To-
ledo L Rev 603, 605 (1988); US Department of Health & Human Services, Surgeon Gen-
eral's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 9 (Apr 1987).
3. See notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
4. Miriam G. Waltzer, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Infection with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 36 Loyola L Rev 55, 57 (1990). See also Surgeon Gen-
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mined to have been infected with the HIV virus if he or she tests
seropositive for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) an-
tibodies; a seropositive result indicates that antibodies to an AIDS-
causing virus are present in the blood." One who tests seropositive
may outwardly show no signs of the infection but is still capable of
transmitting the virus.' The latency period for HIV infection may
last up to and beyond five years.
Before the HIV infection develops into "full blown" AIDS, an
individual may develop AIDS-Related Complex (ARC)." ARC
symptoms include night sweats, weight loss, enlarged lymph nodes,
and diarrhea.9
The full AIDS syndrome represents the final stage of HIV com-
plications.10 This stage results in the occurrence of certain oppor-
tunistic infections caused by the virus' active attack on the body's
immune system.1 Symptoms of full AIDS syndrome include
chronic diarrhea, skin lesions, weight loss, fever, shortness of
breath, fatigue, malaise, confusion, loss of respiratory and digestive
functions, and neurologic problems resulting from AIDS demen-
tia.' 2 Practically all patients die within five years of being diag-
nosed with full AIDS syndrome.' 3 It has been noted that AIDS has
already killed more Americans than the Vietnam War.'
4
To date, medical problems have not been the only difficulties
faced by AIDS patients. The impact on American society, in the
form of fear, prejudice, and moral judgment is also heavily felt by
the HIV-infected individual. Such individuals are often shunned
eral's Report at 9 (cited in note 2).
5. Lally-Green, 19 U Toledo L Rev at 606 n 12 (cited in note 2).
6. Waltzer, 36 Loyola L Rev at 57 (cited in note 4).
7. Id. There are cases in which HIV infection has not developed into AIDS. It is still
undetermined whether these cases simply represent long latency periods or whether these
individuals will never get AIDS. Id at 57 n 14.
8. Id at 57.
9. Id.
10. Lally-Green, 19 U Toledo L Rev at 606 (cited in note 2).
11. Id at 606-07. Examples of such infections include a rare form of skin cancer called
Kaposi's sarcoma and the lung disease pneumocystis carinii pneumonia. Id at 607.
12. Id.
13. Eric C. Sohlgren, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against AIDS Victims:
Falling Through the Gaps of Federal Law-ERISA, The Rehabilitation Act and the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, 24 Loyola LA L Rev 1247, 1253 (June 1991).
14. Sohlgren, Group Health Benefits Discrimination against AIDS Victims at 1247
(cited in note 13). There had been 94,375 American adult AIDS deaths reported through
October 1990, compared to nearly 58,000 Americans killed and missing in action in the Viet-
nam war. Id at 1247 n 1.
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by their families. 5 Health care workers have refused to care for
AIDS patients.16 Religious leaders have preached AIDS as a curse
from God for sinful behavior.1 7 School children have been isolated
within and banned from schools. 8 It has been observed that the
terror of AIDS has caused rational, charitable, church-going peo-
ple, who would give their lives to help victims of flood or fire, to
turn their backs on neighbors with AIDS.19
The prejudices and moral judgments harbored against those in-
fected with HIV will be manifested in the workplace in a variety of
forms. A glaring example involving employee health benefits oc-
curred in late 1987. The Circle K Corporation, employer of some
8,000 individuals, informed its workforce that their medical plan
would no longer cover health problems resulting from "personal
lifestyle decisions."20 The purpose and result of the policy was to
cover AIDS claims resulting from blood transfusions-but not
cover the claims of drug users and homosexuals. 2' After extensive
adverse publicity and criticism by benefit consultants, Circle K
Corporation dropped its "personal lifestyle decision" policy in Sep-
tember, 1988.22 The remainder of this comment addresses discrimi-
nation in the health benefits afforded to employees infected with
HIV.
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)2 s protects employees and dependents who are directly af-
fected by employee benefit plans. 24 Section 510 of ERISA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fire, suspend, expel, disci-
pline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan,. . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right
to which such participant may become entitled under the plan .... 15





20. Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1247 n 5 (cited in note 13).
21. Id.
22. Id. See also John P. Furfaro and Maury B. Josephson, Health Benefits of Em-
ployees with AIDS, 205 NY L J 3 (May 3, 1991).
23. 29 USC § 1001 (1988).
24. ERISA, § 2(c), 29 USC § 1001(a) (1988).
25. ERISA, § 510, 29 USC § 1140 (emphasis added).
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Although ERISA is often thought of as a pension-protector, the
statute expressly covers group health insurance plans sponsored by
the employer.26
An employer cannot discharge an employee from his or her em-
ployment in order to deprive the employee of continued participa-
tion in an employer-provided health insurance program. In Folz v
Marriott Corp.,27 an exemplary employee was diagnosed with mul-
tiple sclerosis and informed his employer of such.28 In less than
two months the employee was put on probation and subsequently
fired.29 The court found that the employer's stated reasons for dis-
charge were pretext; the employee had been discharged because of
financial motivations, so as to deny the employee the advantages of
the employer's benefit plans.30 This was a clear violation of
ERISA.3 1
An employer who provides group health insurance in our society
will eventually be faced with this scenario: (1) one or more employ-
ees are diagnosed with HIV, ARC, or AIDS, (2) the prospect of
paying for the medical care required of this catastrophic illness, for
an undetermined number of years, looms large on the financial ho-
rizon, and (3) if the employee is fired, the employer will be facing
the "inescapable inference ... that an ulterior motive lay behind
its ... maneuvers." 2 The employer's current solution to this
problem is quite simple and, if handled properly, quite legal:
change the terms of the company health plan and place a low ceil-
ing on the maximum lifetime benefits for AIDS-related claims."3
In McGann v H & H Music Co.,34 H & H Music employee John
McGann was diagnosed with AIDS in December, 1987 and soon
thereafter submitted his first claims for reimbursement under the
26. ERISA, § 3(1), 29 USC § 1002(1). An "employee welfare benefit plan" under
ERISA encompasses:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of pro-
viding for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event
of sickness, for] death ..
Id (emphasis added).
27. 594 F Supp 1007 (W D Mo 1984).
28. Folz, 594 F Supp at 1011.
29. Id.
30. Id at 1015.
31. Id.
32. Id, quoting Ursic v Bethlehem Mines, 556 F Supp 571, 575 (W D Pa 1983).
33. See notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
34. 946 F2d 401 (5th Cir 1991).
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employer's medical plan." The plan provided lifetime medical ben-
efits of up to $1,000,000 for all employees."8 In July, 1988 the em-
ployer announced that it would become self-insured, and that the
new plan would limit benefits for AIDS-related claims to a lifetime
maximum of $5,000. 3 McGann sued his employer, claiming dis-
criminatory treatment under Section 510 of ERISA 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court or-
der granting summary judgment for defendant-employer H & H
Music. 9 The employer had not promised that the $1,000,000 limi-
tation was permanent; the terms of the plan expressly provided
that the "sponsor may terminate or amend the Plan at any time or
terminate any benefit . . at any time."' 0 The circuit court noted
the United States Supreme Court's observance that "ERISA does
not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and
does not itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of em-
ployee benefits."'
1
The circuit court could not reconcile McGann's claim with the
"well-settled principle" that ERISA was not intended to circum-
scribe an employer's control over the content of benefit plans.'
2 If
ERISA prevented an employer from reducing or eliminating a par-
ticular coverage in response to the escalating costs of such cover-
age, the statute would be in effect changing the terms of the em-
ployer's benefit plan.'3
Finally, the court found that ERISA does not "prohibit welfare
plan discrimination between or among categories of diseases.
''
44
Thus, under ERISA, an employer can elect not to cover AIDS-re-
lated claims, and yet continue to cover other catastrophic ill-
nesses-even if that decision stems from a prejudice against AIDS
or its victims.
45
The result in McGann is likely unsettling to much of our society,
including the courts. In denying an employee's request for a tem-
porary restraining order to stop an AIDS-related benefits limita-





40. Id at 405.
41. Id at 406, quoting Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 US 85, 91 (1983).
42. McGann, 946 F2d at 407.





tion similar to McGann, District Judge Forrester of the Seventh
Circuit was nevertheless "disturb[ed] . . . that an employer under
• . . ERISA can modify a plan so as to deny benefits to a member
of a plan during the course of a treatment regimen .... , In
Owens v Storehouse, Inc.,4 Judge Forrester subsequently granted
the defendant-employer's motions for summary judgment. The
employee in Owens had received approximately $116,000 in AIDS-
related benefits when the employer changed the plan's $1,000,000
maximum lifetime benefit to $25,000.48 The employee alleged dis-
crimination in violation of Section 510 of ERISA.49 Judge Forrester
determined that a prerequisite to a Section 510 action is "an alle-
gation that the employer/employee relationship, and not merely
the plan, was changed in some discriminatory or wrongful way." 50
Judge Forrester thus concluded that the employer's unilateral
modification could not support a Section 510 claim. 51
In addition, the employee alleged that the employer's actions
breached the fiduciary duty owed under the subject ERISA plan.52
This argument also failed. Judge Forrester found that there may
be a fiduciary duty in administering the plan, but not, as here, in
modifying or altering non-vested contingent benefits; the employer
is free to act in accordance with its own interests when not ad-
ministering or investing the plan.5
THE REACH OF ERISA
The preemptive effect of ERISA greatly magnifies the signifi-
cance of the federal decisions interpreting the statute. A normal
area of protection for AIDS patients is state law. State laws pro-
hibit employers from discriminating against AIDS-related claims
in employee benefit plans.54 ERISA, however, provides an avenue
through which an employer can avoid state law. ERISA expressly
46. Owens v Storehouse, Inc., 773 F Supp 414, 415 (N D Ga 1990).
47. 773 F Supp 416 (N D Ga 1991).
48. Owens, 773 F Supp at 418.
49. Id.
50. Id at 419, quoting Deeming v American Standard, Inc., 905 F2d 1124, 1127 (7th
Cir 1990).
51. Owens, 773 F Supp at 419.
52. Id.
53. Id, citing Young v Standard Oil (Indiana), 849 F2d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir 1988),
and Phillips v Amoco Oil Co., 799 F2d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir 1986).
54. Most states prohibit such discrimination through insurance statutes or employ-
ment discrimination statutes. For a discussion and listing of relevant state laws, see Sohl-
gren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1246-51 nn 6-7 (cited in note 13).
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preempts state laws which relate to employee benefit plans if the
particular law does not regulate insurance.5 As a result, if a state
law prohibits AIDS discrimination in employee benefit plans and
does not purport to regulate insurance, it is pre-empted by
ERISA. 6
Further, state insurance laws which regulate employee benefit
plans may also be preempted. The United States Supreme Court
has distinguished between insured benefit plans and those which
are employer self-insured; a state can indirectly regulate insured
benefit plans but not employer self-insured plans.57 This allows an
employer, by funding its benefit plan through self-insurance, to
avoid state insurance laws which prohibit AIDS-related
discrimination.
58
Understanding that state insurance and employment discrimina-
tion laws can be preempted by ERISA, the attention thus turns to
federal employment discrimination statutes.
55. ERISA, § 514, 29 USC § 1144 (1988). The statute states that it "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan . . ." ERISA § 514(a), 29 USC § 1144(a).
The United States Supreme Court in Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 US 85 (1983), has
interpreted this preemption broadly. The preemption can apply to state laws not specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans, and cannot "be interpreted to preempt only state
laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA." Shaw, 463 US at 98 (1983).
The statutory exception to this preemption states that "nothing in this title shall be con-
strued to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities." ERISA, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 USC § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). A state can-
not, however, deem that employee benefit plans are insurance and attempt to regulate such
plans under this preemption exception. ERISA, § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 USC § 1144(b)(2)(B).
56. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v Dedeaux, 481 US 41, 44-51 (1986).
57. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Massachusetts, 471 US 724 (1984). The Court
stated:
We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured and unin-
sured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not.
By so doing we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress [in ERISA], .
a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 US at 747.
The Court affirmed its Metropolitan Life analysis in FMC Corp. v Holliday, US ,111
S Ct 403 (1990). ERISA, § 514(b)(2)(B) "exempt[s] self-funded ERISA plans from state
laws that 'regulatfe] insurance' within the meaning of" Section 514(b)(2)(A). FMC Corp.,
111 S Ct at 409. "On the other hand, employee benefit plans that are insured are subject to
indirect state insurance regulation." Id.
58. Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1264 n 104 (cited in note 13), lists the following
examples: Mullenix v Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 912 F2d 1406 (11th Cir 1990); Gonzales v
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 901 F2d 446 (5th Cir 1990); Baxter v Lynn, 886 F2d 182 (8th Cir
1989); Reilly v Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F2d 416 (7th Cir 1988);
United Food & Commercial Workers v Pacyga, 801 F2d 1157 (9th Cir 1986).
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THE REHABILITATION ACT
The federal Rehabilitation Act 59 protects against discrimination
on the basis of handicap and extends to discrimination in em-
ployee benefit plans.60 The Rehabilitation Act is limited in scope,
however, applying only to federal contractors and recipients of fed-
eral grants.6 1
The Rehabilitation Act does not expressly identify AIDS as a
covered handicap. In Chalk v United States District Court,62 a
federal court found that the Rehabilitation Act's coverage does ex-
tend to AIDS. 3 The court relied on School Board of Nassau
County v Arline,64 where the United States Supreme Court held
that a person with the contagious disease of tuberculosis may be a
"handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act.65 Federal
legislation passed after Arline confirmed that contagious disease
may be covered under the Rehabilitation Act. 6 In addition, the
federal Office of Contract Compliance Programs has adopted the
policy that the Rehabilitation Act covers HIV-infected
employees.
67
It has been persuasively contended, however, that the Rehabili-
tation Act nevertheless proves ineffective even for the small per-
centage of employees that it does cover.6 The Rehabilitation Act
does not require an employer to assume an undue financial bur-
den. 9 An employer could thus self-insure an employee benefits
program, then limit AIDS-related coverage under the guise of "un-
due financial burden. '70
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIEs ACT
The final and most important piece of existing federal legislation
59. 29 USC § 701 (1988).
60. 29 USC §§ 793, 794. The employer must act "without discrimination based upon
[the individual's]... physical or mental handicap in all employment practices such as...
rates of pay or other forms of compensation." 41 CFR §§ 60-741.1 (1990).
61. Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC §§ 793, 794 (1988).
62. 840 F2d 701 (9th Cir 1988).
63. Chalk, 840 F2d 701 (1988). See also Doe v Dolton Elementary School Dist., 694 F
Supp 440, 443-45, (N D I1 1988).
64. 480 US 273 (1987).
65. Arline, 480 US at 280-86.
66. Civil Rights Restoration Act, 29 USC § 706(8)(D) (West Supp 1991).
67. Office of Contract Compliance Programs Notice, Ch 6, December 23, 1988.





which may affect AIDS-related employee benefit coverage is the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).7 1 The ADA was passed in
part to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties. '72 The Act prohibits employers from:
discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
73
Fringe benefits, such as employee health insurance, are covered by
the ADA as "other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
'74
A "disability" under the ADA is defined as: (1) "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual," (2) "a record of such an
impairment," or (3) "being regarded as having such an impair-
ment. ' 75 The ADA was intended to encompass HIV infection
under its "disability" provisions. 6
The question, therefore, is whether the ADA will prohibit an em-
ployer from severely restricting employee health benefits for AIDS-
related claims. The insurance provisions of the ADA, which have
been described as "cryptic," 77 do not provide an express answer.78
In addition, an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) attorney, responsible for drafting the EEOC's regulations
implementing the ADA, has indicated that the EEOC regulations
71. 42 USCA § 12101 (West Supp 1991). The ADA, Subchapter I of which covers
employment, becomes effective July 26, 1992 for employers with twenty-five or more em-
ployees and two years thereafter for employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 USCA §
12111(5)(A).
72. ADA, 42 USCA § 12101(b)(1) (West Supp 1991).
73. 42 USCA § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
74. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed Reg
8589 (1991), to be codified at 29 CFR § 1630.4 (proposed Feb 28, 1991).
75. ADA, 42 USCA § 12102(2) (West Supp 1991).
76. See Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1288 (cited in note 13), citing House Com-
mittee on Education & Labor, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, HR Rep No 485(11),
101st Cong, 2d Sess 52 (1990).
77. Furfaro and Josephson, 205 NY L J at 3 (cited in note 22).
78. See notes 80-88 and accompanying text. The Indiana Civil Rights Commission,
however, may disagree with this analysis. In Westhoven v Lincoln Foodservice Prods. Inc.,
No EMha89030350 (Ind Civ Rights Comm, Mar 22, 1991), an employer placed a lifetime cap
of $50,000 on AIDS-related claims while other claims retained a lifetime maximum benefit
of $1,000,000. In determining that this was an impermissable discrimination under state law,
the commission opined that the employer's actions were clearly prohibited by the ADA.
Furfaro and Josephson, 205 NY L J at 3 (cited in note 22).
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also do not specifically answer this question.79
The insurance provisions of the ADA allow "bona fide benefit
plan[s]," including employer-funded programs, to be based on "un-
derwriting risks, classifying risks, or [the] administering [of] such
risks."80 Thus, the ADA does not affect employer actions which are
consistent with insurance risk classifications. 81 Further, the ADA's
insurance provisions do not alter the preemptive effect of ERISA
nor an employer's administration of self-insured benefit
programs.2
The ADA does, however, regulate the motives behind an em-
ployer's decision to limit the health benefits available for AIDS-
related claims. In an extremely significant provision, the ADA pro-
hibits an employer from using insurance risk classification "as a
subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the statute.83 Within this lan-
guage lies the answer as to whether the ADA will be effective in
protecting employee health benefits for AIDS-related claims. A re-
striction on AIDS-related coverage based on sound actuarial prin-
ciples would arguably not violate the ADA;8 4 the same restriction,
however, would be prohibited if the impetus of such restriction was
to evade the purposes of the ADA. 5
The obvious problem is in determining what constitutes a "sub-
terfuge" to avoid the purposes of the ADA. The statute does not
specifically address this question. The EEOC has requested com-
ments regarding insurance, risk classification, and actuarial princi-
79. Furfaro and Josephson, 205 NY L J at 3 (cited in note 22).
80. ADA, 42 USCA § 12201(c) (West Supp 1991). Section 12201(c) states that the
ADA shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict:
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization,
or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to
State laws that regulate insurance.
Id.
81. Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1290 nn 280-81 (cited in note 13), citing House
Committee on Education & Labor, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, HR Rep No
485(11), 101st Cong, 2d Sess 52 (1990).
82. Id.
83. ADA, 42 USCA § 12201(c) (West Supp 1991).
84. Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1292 (cited in note 13).
85. ADA, 42 USCA § 12201(c) (West Supp 1991).
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ples to aid in the development of ADA compliance regulations.86
The ADA, however, does not provide for much regulatory discre-
tion; thus it has been suggested that EEOC regulations will proba-
bly be of little assistance. In addition, interpretation by the
courts of similar statutory language would indicate that an AIDS-
related coverage restriction may simply satisfy the "subterfuge" re-
quirement if based on proper actuarial and insurance principles. 88
CONCLUSION
American society currently relies on the employment relation-
ship to play an integral role in the funding and delivery of health
care to its residents. As the rate of HIV infection escalates and as
the treatments improve, the health care system and society will
face a continually increasing burden. Employers faced with fund-
ing for the care of these patients will continue to significantly re-
strict the amount of AIDS-related coverage available in employee
benefit programs. Difficult decisions have to be made.
The "subterfuge" language of the ADA provides an avenue
through which HIV-infected employees may find protection. 9 The
ambiguity of such language will lead to costly litigation, however,
further draining the nation's resources and adding to the trauma of
an already horrific disease. 90 Thus, commentators have called for
federal legislation or regulation to clearly establish guidelines for
employers."' An employer, for example, could be prohibited from
limiting coverage for AIDS "while continuing to cover other cata-
strophic or chronic disabilities at normal levels.19 2
More elementary questions still remain. Should the employment
86. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed Reg
8579 (1991). The EEOC posed the following questions:
1. What are the current risk assessment or classification practices with respect to
health and life insurance coverage in the area of employment?
2. Must risk assessment or classification be based on actuarial statistics?
3. What is the relationship between "risk" and "cost?"
4. Must an employer or insurance company consider the effect on individuals with
disabilities before making cost saving changes in its insurance coverage?
Id.
87. Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1295 n 309 (cited in note 13).
88. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 USC § 623(f)(2) (1988);
Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1293 nn 293-97 (cited in note 13).
89. See notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
90. See Furfaro and Josephson, 205 NY L J at 3 (cited in note 22).
91. See Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1294-99 (cited in note 13); Furfaro and
Josephson, 205 NY L J at 3 (cited in note 22).
92. Sohlgren, 24 Loyola LA L Rev at 1298 (cited in note 13).
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relationship continue to be expected to fill this role, carry this bur-
den, in our society? In an era where American employers are in-
creasingly accused of inferior productivity and efficiency in com-
parison with their foreign counterparts, should the burden of
funding a significant part of the nation's health care be placed on
their shoulders? And to what degree should health care providers
be expected to absorb a portion of the cost, if any, of their ser-
vices? These questions represent no small issue in today's soci-
ety-evidenced by the fact that national health care reform is be-
coming a potent, effective political weapon. 3
John F. Dudley
93. See Susan Dentzer, No More Patient Patients, 111 US News & World Report 50,
51 (Nov 18, 1991); Michael Kramer, The Voter's Latest Ailment: Health Care, 138 Time 51
(Nov 11, 1991).
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